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ARTICLES
IS EXPERT EVIDENCE REALLY DIFFERENT?
Frederick Schauer and Barbara A. Spellman*
INTRODUCTION
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 has transformed much of
American evidence law. In assigning judges the role of “gatekeepers” of scientific and other expert evidence,2 and in setting out a list of factors3
© 2013 Frederick Schauer and Barbara A. Spellman. Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below
cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a
citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Frederick Schauer is David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at
the University of Virginia. Barbara Spellman is Professor of Psychology and Professor of
Law at the University of Virginia. This Article was written while both authors were Visiting
Professors of Law at the Columbia Law School, and we are happy to acknowledge
Columbia’s tangible and intangible support. An earlier version of this Article was prepared
for the University of Texas School of Law’s seminar series on recent developments in
evidence law scholarship, and we are grateful to Larry Laudan for the invitation and the
ensuing discussion. Comments on earlier drafts by Ron Allen, David Bernstein, Jim
Liebman, Michael Pardo, Dan Richman, and Peter Strauss have presented us with valuable
insights and challenges which we have attempted to incorporate and address, although
almost certainly with far from perfect success.
1 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2 See id. at 597; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)
(reaffirming Daubert and applying it to all expert testimony); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (same).
3 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95. None of the factors is required. But although the
Court denies that they are a “definitive checklist or test,” the listed factors have in practice
dominated the judicial inquiry into reliability and are widely understood, together, to erect
stringent barriers to admissibility. Id. at 593; see also Balaban v. City of Cleveland, No.
1:07–cv–1366, 2010 WL 481283, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2010) (noting “Daubert’s stringent requirements”); Munoz v. United States, No. 07-CV-2080(ILG), 2008 WL 2942861, at
*14 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008) (describing Daubert standards as “more stringent” than that
applied to other testimony); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 526 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252
(D.R.I. 2007) (noting Daubert’s “stringent” standards of reliability); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1517 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (same); Cavallo v. Star
Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 773 (E.D. Va. 1995) (same); 3 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702:5, at 105–06 (6th ed. 2006) (complaining that Daubert has
turned out in application to be more stringent than the Court intended); Paul C. Gian1
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designed principally to keep so-called junk science out of the courtroom,4
the Supreme Court launched the trial process on a course in which Daubert
hearings and Daubert-inspired exclusions of expert evidence are a pervasive
feature of modern federal and state litigation.5
Daubert has been subject to many criticisms. Some focus on the majority’s clumsy philosophy of science.6 Others note the poor fit between the
Daubert criteria and the diverse types of expert evidence to which Daubert now
applies.7 Still others express the concern that Daubert’s heightened evidentiary hurdles disproportionately burden the mass tort and employment discrimination plaintiffs who are more likely to rely on non-traditional experts
and expertise.8 And there is the broad worry that law should not outsource
its own irreducibly legal determinations to science and scientists with different goals and consequently different standards.9
nelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1111
(2000) (“Daubert has evolved into a stringent standard in civil cases.”).
4 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95. On Daubert’s concern with junk science, see Joiner,
509 U.S. at 153 (Stevens, J., concurring). For the most prominent attack on the use of junk
science, see PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991). And on understanding Daubert in such terms, see Edward D. Cavanagh, Making
Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 117 (2011) (interpreting Daubert as focused on the
problem of junk science); A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical Studies Tell Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 111 (2005) (same).
5 Daubert was an interpretation of the version of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence that existed at the time of the decision, and was the impetus, along with Joiner
and Kumho Tire, for the current version of that rule. As such, the Daubert trilogy is applicable only in the federal courts, but the majority of states have nevertheless chosen to follow
Daubert’s lead with few modifications. See Clark Hedger, Comment, Daubert and the States:
A Critical Analysis of Emerging Trends, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 177, 190–205 (2004); see also
Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 485–513 (2005) (analyzing adoption and non-adoption of Daubert in state courts).
6 See David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox
of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685, 703–24
(2000); Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr.
Joiner, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 217, 230–35 (2001); Susan Haack, Federal Philosophy of
Science: A Deconstruction—And a Reconstruction, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 394 (2010).
7 See Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1006 (Alaska 2005) (describing Daubert as
“useless” for non-scientific expert evidence (internal quotation marks omitted)); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 7.7, at 722 (3d ed. 2009) (arguing
that applying Daubert factors to non-scientific evidence loses “any sense of rigor”); David E.
Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution,
93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 480–88 (2008). Daubert was initially restricted to scientific evidence,
509 U.S. at 590 n.8, but Kumho Tire made clear that the Daubert principles applied to all
expert evidence, whether scientific or not. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141.
8 See Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 65, 78 (2006); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil
Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 551–55 (2010).
9 See Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
1047, 1047–70 (2003); Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience,
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These criticisms are not without force, but the difficulties with Daubert
go deeper. The real problem is not so much about Daubert and the subsequent cases in its line of authority10 as it is about the very way in which evidence law treats expertise generally. Using experts is, of course, invaluable in
numerous litigation settings. But as the price of allowing experts to testify
about matters of which they have neither first-hand nor case-specific factual
knowledge,11 evidence law requires expert evidence to satisfy a higher threshold for admissibility than that which ordinarily applies to non-expert evidence. In other words, it is the law of expert evidence generally, and not
merely Daubert’s gloss on it, that excludes a great deal of otherwise relevant
evidence.
Excluding relevant evidence might be thought something of a concern,12 but of course that is what much, and perhaps even most, of evidence
law does.13 Sometimes the exclusion of relevant evidence is a function of a
goal extrinsic to the truth-finding process (as with most privileges, for example).14 More often, however, relevant evidence is excluded because of the
fear that certain kinds of admittedly relevant evidence will be overvalued by
the trier of fact.15 It is this fear of overvaluation that grounds, for example,

Lie Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1191–1219 (2010); Note, Admitting
Doubt: A New Standard for Scientific Evidence, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2021–42 (2010).
10 Most important is Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 145 (holding Daubert’s general concern
with reliability is applicable to all expert evidence, and not just the evidence that might be
considered scientific). Also important in the post-Daubert history is General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997) (holding that the admission of scientific evidence required
a determination of reliability of the particular expert’s particular testimony).
11 On the requirement that a lay witness have personal knowledge of the facts about
which she is testifying, see FED. R. EVID. 602.
12 As it is to those who sympathize with the so-called free proof tradition. See 1 JEREMY
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 4 (photo. reprint 1995) (John S. Mill ed.,
1827) (claiming that “almost every rule that has ever been laid down on the subject of
evidence . . . is repugnant to the ends of justice”); Mirjan Damas̆ka, Free Proof and Its Detractors, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 343–57 (1995).
13 See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 25–30 (2005); A. Leo Levin & Harold K. Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 905,
915–16, 926 (1971); Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 165, 176–79, 196–97 (2006).
14 See Schauer, supra note 13, at 167. The same kind of exclusion for non-epistemic
reasons explains those rules designed to create incentives for beneficial out-of-court conduct, as with the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures. See FED. R. EVID.
407; Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980) (explaining that people
would “be less likely to take subsequent remedial measures if their repairs or improvements would be used against them in a lawsuit arising out of a prior accident”).
15 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 1.1, at 2; Henry M. Hart, Jr., & John T.
McNaughton, Some Aspects of Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE
48, 56 (Daniel Lerner ed., 1959).
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the exclusion of hearsay16 and much of the bar on the use of character
evidence.17
The same fear of overvaluation also explains much of the exclusion of
relevant expert evidence.18 The risk that juries will overvalue the evidence of
experts has long been thought so likely that a standard for admissibility
higher than mere relevance emerged as the barrier to jury overvaluation of
expert testimony.19 But the claim that juries (or even judges) will overvalue
the testimony of experts is an empirical one, and may well be unsound.20
Moreover, the contention that juries will overvalue expert evidence is based
on an implicit comparison with the presumed accuracy, or at least lack of
overvaluation, of more direct evidence, such as the testimony of an eyewitness observer. But that presumption may also be empirically unsound.21
And if the empirical assumptions about overvaluation of expert opinion and
accuracy of direct factual testimony are both mistaken, then the traditional
restrictions on expert evidence may be mistaken as well.
Thus, the problem with expert evidence is not the inappropriateness of
the Daubert approach. The narrow focus on Daubert is misplaced. The real
problem is with the more deeply entrenched view that expert evidence
should be excluded under circumstances in which analogous non-expert evidence would be admitted. Daubert embodies the distinction between expert
and non-expert evidence, but it is that very distinction, and not just Daubert,
that is the problem. Daubert has indeed transformed modern evidence law,
but perhaps it has awakened us to the need for a more profound transformation, one in which the very foundations of treating expert testimony differently are undercut. This is a larger claim than that Daubert itself is a problem,
and it is this larger claim we seek to advance here.22
16 See Edmund M. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L.
REV. 247, 255 (1937). There are other accounts of the exclusion of hearsay, including the
view that hearsay is excluded because of concerns about confrontation with adverse witnesses. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J.
1011, 1012–26 (1998). Others view the exclusion of hearsay as creating incentives for parties to bring the best available evidence to court. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence
Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 267, 274 (1988). But the fear of jury overvaluation remains
dominant.
17 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evidence:
The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741 (2008).
18 See infra Section II.
19 For a sense of just how long the special treatment of expert evidence has been based
on the fear of disproportionate (compared to non-expert evidence) over-valuation of
expert testimony, see 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVIDENCE 526–29 (Edgar W. Camp & John F.
Crowe eds., 1905). See also Haviland v. Kansas City, P. & G. R. Co., 72 S.W. 515, 517 (Mo.
1902) (upholding exclusion of expert testimony because of fear of “gullibility of the jury”).
20 See infra Section III.A.1.
21 See infra Section III.A.2.
22 The argument has been offered earlier, albeit in milder form. See CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 170, at 363–64 (1954). And it has
surfaced at various times since. See Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968); Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 367–68 (Md. 1978); State v. Peters, 534 N.W.2d 867,
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I. THE BASIC ISSUE—BY EXAMPLE
In a recent article, one of the country’s most respected trial judges,
Judge Jed Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, offered a crisp example of the view we challenge here.23 Writing in the Seton Hall Law Review about law and science generally, as well as
about contemporary controversies over the admissibility of lie-detection evidence,24 Judge Rakoff observed that an error rate of thirteen percent, which

872 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH
TO EVIDENCE 735–36 (1989); 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 1–6, at 30–33 (3d ed. 1999); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1232–43
(1980); John W. Osborne, Judicial/Technical Assessment of Novel Scientific Evidence, 1990 U.
ILL. L. REV. 497, 512; John William Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 22. But because Daubert made clear (or at least as clear as
Daubert made anything) that Rule 702 imposed requirements going beyond relevance, suggestions that expert testimony should be evaluated according to a relevance standard have
faded into the background. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590–92
(1993). More importantly, our concern here is not, as it was for McCormick and others,
with whether relevance is the appropriate conceptual repository within which to weigh the
probative value of expert testimony against its assumed prejudicial effect. Rather, we argue
that it is the treatment of expert testimony as deserving special skepticism that is the problem. What makes McCormick’s version milder is that he and his successors appeared to
assume that special skepticism was warranted, with the only question being whether the
special skepticism should be located within a relevancy analysis or instead within a distinct
rule and separate inquiry. See MCCORMICK, supra, § 170, at 363–64. Our argument here is
against the very assumption of special skepticism, making our claim different from and less
mild than McCormick’s.
23 Jed S. Rakoff, Science and the Law: Uncomfortable Bedfellows, 38 SETON HALL L. REV.
1379 (2008).
24 The debates about the use of lie-detection evidence have become more salient in
light of recent advances in neuroscience and the possibility of neuroscience-based lie
detection. See United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2012); Wilson v.
Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); Martha J. Farah & Cayce J.
Hook, The Seductive Allure of “Seductive Allure,” 8 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 88, 88–89 (2013);
Henry T. Greely & Judy Iles, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation,
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 378 (2007); J.R.H. Law, Cherry-Picking Memories: Why NeuroimagingBased Lie Detection Requires a New Framework for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence under FRE
702 and Daubert, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 3–5 (2011); Joëlle Anne Moreno, The Future of
Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law, 42 AKRON L. REV. 717, 722 (2009); Michael S. Pardo,
Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 304–06
(2006); Frederick Schauer, Neuroscience, Lie-Detection, and the Law: Contrary to the Prevailing
View, the Suitability of Brain-Based Lie-Detection for Courtroom or Forensic Use Should Be Determined
According to Legal and Not Scientific Standards, 14 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 101, 101–02
(2010); Schauer, supra note 13, at 176; Leo Kittay, Note, Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection:
The Cultural Bias Against “Mind Reading” Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1376–84 (2007).
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is on the high end of the studies examining polygraph reliability,25 would
likely be insufficiently reliable to justify admissibility.26
Judge Rakoff’s conclusion is unimpeachable under current doctrine.
Daubert plainly imposes an additional hurdle for the admissibility of expert
evidence which is more demanding than the standard applied to nonexperts. Whether embodied in Daubert’s focus on scientific validity or in
acceptance within the relevant professional community under the partially
superseded Frye test,27 the basic idea is that expert and scientific evidence will
be admitted only if there is assurance that the methods used and conclusions
drawn have met a stringent standard of reliability.28 Indeed, the fact that
another highly respected federal judge initially rejected even fingerprint evidence in the wake of Daubert29 demonstrates that the gates that Daubert’s
gatekeepers must guard are not easily breached.
25 See Law, supra note 24, at 23–26 (noting many of the studies). For more recent
reviews, see Nobuhito Abe, How the Brain Shapes Deception: An Integrated Review of the Literature, 17 NEUROSCIENTIST 560, 560–70 (2011); Paul Root Wolpe et al., Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie-Detection: Promises and Perils, AM. J. BIOETHICS, OCT. 2010, at 40, 40–47;
Dingcheng Wu et al., Neural Correlates of Evaluations of Lying and Truth-Telling in Different
Social Contexts, 1389 BRAIN RES. 115, 115–23 (2011).
26 See Rakoff, supra note 23, at 1382–83; infra text accompanying notes 30–32.
Although there is an important difference between a non-obligatory factor and a requirement, the Court, in Daubert, asserted that, in the case of scientific evidence, “the court
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
This phrase is ambiguous as between whether a court should just consider whether there is
a known error rate or consider what the error rate actually is, but Kumho Tire strongly
suggests that reliability is the touchstone and that what the error rate actually is, rather
than merely whether there is a known error rate, is an important component of a reliability
determination. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999); David W.
Barnes, General Acceptance Versus Scientific Soundness: Mad Scientists in the Courtroom, 31 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 303, 317–23 (2004); Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts,
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 200 (2003). And thus courts applying Daubert to scientific
evidence have commonly taken the size of the error rate as a criterion for admissibility.
See, e.g., Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. C10–861RSM, 2012 WL 5194085, at
*7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 18. 2012) (excluding expert evidence because error rate was too
high); Acker v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032 (D. Kan. 2004)
(admitting evidence); Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 335, 360
(D.N.J. 2002) (excluding evidence).
27 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye remains the prevailing standard in some states. See Hedger, supra note 5, at 109. Its focus on acceptance
within the relevant professional community persists in federal courts as one of the multiple
Daubert factors. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
28 See supra notes 3, 26; see also Zaremba v. Gen. Motors Corp., 360 F.3d 355, 360 (2d
Cir. 2004) (describing Daubert standards as “demanding”); Metro Pony, LLC v. City of
Metropolis, No. 11–cv–144–JPG, 2012 WL 1389656, at *9 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2012) (same).
29 See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, (E.D. Pa. 2001), vacated, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 576 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (Pollak, J.). The point is reinforced by the fact that
Judge Pollak’s decision even preceded the prominent 2009 National Academy of Sciences
report critiquing much of commonly used forensic evidence. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING
THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2009).
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Technically, Daubert does not mandate a specific level of reliability for
expert evidence to be admitted. The decision merely includes the existence
of a known error rate as among the factors weighing in favor of admissibility,30 and the absence of a known error rate as, conversely, inclining against.
But nothing in Daubert requires that the error rate be below a certain level to
make the evidence admissible. In theory, therefore, a known error rate of
thirteen percent (or even higher) need not be fatal to admission. Nevertheless, the focus on a known error rate reinforces Daubert’s concern with substantial reliability for scientific evidence or, now, any expert testimony31 to be
admitted, and subsequent cases have made clear that the size of the error
rate is highly relevant to reliability and thus admissibility.32
Judge Rakoff’s conclusion is entirely consistent with both the holding of
Daubert and the entire post-Daubert regime, but it is nevertheless curious.
Consider the basic relevance standard, a standard which exists in canonical
form for the federal courts as Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Under Rule 401, relevant evidence is evidence having “any tendency to make
a [material] fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”33 And Rule 402 goes on to say that “[r]elevant evidence is admissible”34 except as otherwise excluded by other rules, by statute, or by the
Constitution.35
So consider the application of this basic relevance standard to Judge
Rakoff’s example and the statistics it incorporates. If some piece of evidence
supports proposition P,36 and if its support for P is eighty-seven percent reliable, then P is certainly more probable with this evidence than without.
Eighty-seven percent reliability is far from perfect, but is more than enough
to satisfy the minimal relevance standard embodied in Rules 401 and 402.
That standard would not be satisfied were the results of a polygraph no better
than random, as with, for example, the putative admissibility of astrological
30 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
31 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 145 (extending Daubert to even non-scientific expert
evidence); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (setting forth the criteria of reliability required for the
admission of any expert testimony).
32 See supra note 29.
33 FED. R. EVID. 401.
34 FED. R. EVID. 402.
35 Rule 403 does allow the exclusion of relevant evidence if its unfair prejudicial effect
will substantially outweigh its probative value, and overvaluation is one (but only one) form
of unfair prejudicial effect. See United States v. Muscato, 534 F. Supp. 969, 979 (E.D.N.Y.
1982); Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 715 (Ky. 2009); 1 GRAHAM,
supra note 3, § 401:7, at 386–88. But even apart from the question whether the likelihood
of overvaluation has a tendency to be, as it were, overvalued, see Richard D. Friedman,
Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 969–75, the question
whether all that Daubert does could be done through Rule 403 is, although doctrinally
interesting, not our concern here. See supra note 22. If, as we argue, there is scant reason
for imposing special barriers to the admissibility of expert evidence, it would be just as
mistaken to insert those barriers under the unfair prejudice analysis of Rule 403 as it is to
apply them under Daubert and Rule 702.
36 Including the proposition that some witness was telling the truth.
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data or phrenological experts to provide evidence about a witness’s veracity
or a defendant’s character for, say, violence. But even polygraphs are better
than astrology and phrenology, although opinion differs on just how much
better.37 Still, an item of evidence that is eighty-seven percent likely to provide support for a material conclusion would comfortably clear the “more
probable than without” threshold of minimal relevance. The curious feature
of Judge Rakoff’s doctrinally impeccable conclusion, therefore, is that evidence that comes from an expert or is classed as “scientific” will not be admitted even if non-expert and non-scientific evidence with no greater reliability,
and often with less, would be admitted without question.
Suppose, for example, that a witness with poor eyesight identifies the
defendant, who is of a different race from the witness, as the person he
observed running out of the liquor store on a dark and rainy night at a distance of two hundred feet. It is reasonable to suspect that this identification
is less, probably far less, than eighty-seven percent reliable. Yet none of the
grounds for doubting the reliability of the evidence would necessitate exclusion. The well known deficiencies of cross-race identification,38 coupled with
all the reasons to doubt witness perception in general and the witness’s perception on this occasion,39 would go to the weight of the evidence, but not its
admissibility.
This last example is (more or less) imaginary, but real examples of the
admissibility of substantially unreliable non-expert and nonscientific evidence pervade the law of evidence. Many of the recent DNA-based exonera37 For descriptions and comparisons of various methods and studies, see COMM. TO
REVIEW THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION (2003); KERRY SEGRAVE, LIE DETECTORS (2004); OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING (1983), available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/polygraph/ota. The American Polygraph Association’s own
figures put accuracy in the 85% to 87% range. See Polygraph Validity Research, AM. POLYGRAPH ASS’N, www.polygraph.org/section/resources/polygraph-validity-research (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
38 See Tara Anthony et al., Cross-Racial Facial Identification: A Social Cognitive Integration,
18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 296, 296–300 (1992); Stephanie J. Platz & Harmon
M. Hosch, Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field Study, 18 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL.
972, 974 (1988); Steven M. Smith et al., Postdictors of Eyewitness Errors: Can False Identifications Be Diagnosed in the Cross-Race Situation?, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 153, 153–67
(2001).
39 See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION 7–15 (1995);
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 20–51 (1996); Robert Blonstein & Edward
Geiselman, Effects of Witnessing Conditions and Expert Witness Testimony on Credibility of an
Eyewitness, 8 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 11, 11–18 (1990); Julian Boon & Graham Davies,
Extra-Stimulus Influences on Eyewitness Perception and Recall: Hastorf and Cantril Revisited, 1
LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 155, 156–58, 162–63 (1996); Saul M. Kassin et al., On
the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 413–15
(2001); Gary L. Wells, & Amy L. Bradfield, Distortions in Eyewitness Recollections: Can the
Postidentification-Feedback Be Moderated?, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 138, 138–39, 142 (1999); Gary L.
Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 553, 553–54,
567–68 (1993).
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tions of people convicted of crimes40 have reinforced what psychologists have
known for decades—eyewitness testimony is not nearly as reliable as most
lawyers and laypeople believe.41 Sometimes because of defects in perception
and sometimes on account of flaws in memory, eyewitness testimony, the classic form of direct evidence, is often mistaken.42 Indeed, numerous studies
show that the accuracy rates of commonly admitted eyewitness identifications
and other forms of eyewitness testimony may fall substantially below the accuracy rates of commonly excluded (under Daubert) scientific and expert evidence.43 And although courts are increasingly permitting experts to testify
about the inaccuracy of eyewitness and other direct evidence,44 and although
there are now numerous avenues for post-conviction relief focus on correcting the errors of erroneous convictions based on mistaken identifications
or other forms of mistaken direct testimony,45 it has yet to be suggested that
40 See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 5–6 (2011); Sophia S. Chang,
Note, Protecting the Innocent: Post-Conviction DNA Exoneration, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285,
287 (2009).
41 See LOFTUS, supra note 39, at 20–51; Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is
Still Not Common Sense: Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 116–17 (2006); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness
Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
765, 787 (1995). Indeed, this conclusion is hardly breaking news for psychologists. See
HUGO MÜNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 39, 47, 56–58, 61, 63–65 (1908). Nevertheless, the law, and the law of evidence in particular, has often resisted it. See, e.g., John H.
Wigmore, Professor Muensterberg and the Psychology of Testimony: Being a Report of the Case of
Cokestone v. Munsterberg, 3 ILL. L. REV. 399, 399–434 (1909) (responding satirically to
Münsterberg’s treatise).
42 The research is vast. See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45, 45–69 (2006) (offering a good review of the topic);
supra notes 38, 41. For a recent short summary, see Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness
Identification, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 24, 24–26 (2011). Other representative contributions include Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the
Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 687–704 (2004);
Jonathan M. Fawcett et al., Of Guns and Geese: A Meta-Analytic Review of the ‘Weapon Focus’
Literature, 19 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 35, 35–62 (2013); Charles A. Morgan III et al., Accuracy
of Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 INT’L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 265, 265–77 (2004).
43 A valuable survey of the psychological research on eyewitness identification and testimony, and its implications for criminal trial practice, is in Young v. Conway, 698 F.2d 69,
80 (2d Cir. 2012).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 762 F. Supp. 2d 270, 275 (D. Mass 2010); State v.
Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 762 (Conn. 2012). See generally Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should
Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2007)
(arguing that all judges should allow expert testimony regarding weaknesses of eyewitness
identifications); Cindy J. O’Hagan, When Seeing is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert
Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741 (1993) (same). Indeed, a recent decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court goes a step further in requiring, when relevant in criminal cases, a jury
instruction on the potential problems with eyewitness identification. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 925 (N.J. 2011).
45 See GARRETT, supra note 40, at 224–31, 239; Peter Neufeld, Legal and Ethical Implications of Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 639, 641, 645 (2001).
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the typical eyewitness identification should be excluded at trial.46 However
defective such identifications may turn out to be, it is difficult in the typical
case to argue that their admission would not render some proposition—the
defendant’s guilt, for example—more likely with the testimony than without,
which is exactly what Rule 401 requires—and no more.
Thus the question is clearly presented. Why is commonly (even if not
usually) defective direct evidence subject to admission under a lower threshold for admissibility than expert and scientific evidence? Both forms of evidence have flaws, and both have value, but the higher threshold for scientific
and expert evidence presupposes that it is even more flawed than direct evidence, or more likely to be misused, or more beset with other problems. But
what is the basis for this comparative distrust of expert and scientific evidence, and is that distrust justified?
II. THE RATIONALES
The seeming anomaly of Judge Rakoff’s conclusion that expert evidence
must clear an additional or higher hurdle has traditionally been justified on
three grounds. One is that expert witnesses are permitted to offer opinions
when lay witnesses would be restricted to bare facts.47 The second is that
experts are permitted to rely on hearsay and other inadmissible information,
especially in the form of collective or published opinions of other experts, in
ways that lay witnesses may not.48 And although the greater testimonial leeway afforded to experts might in theory justify placing stricter limits on their
testimony,49 the third and, in fact, principal justification for the differential
treatment has long been the belief that expert testimony has such a persua46 Oregon does require exclusion where there has been impermissible police suggestion to a witness. See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 698 (Or. 2012).
47 See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 438 (1887); Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N.Y. 507, 519
(1884); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 40 Miss. 352, 358 (Miss. 1866); Learned Hand, Historical and
Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 50 (1901).
48 See FED. R. EVID. 703; United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002);
McLaughlin v. Fisher Eng’g, 834 A.2d 258, 263 (N.H. 2003); see also Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583,
583 (1987) (recognizing that expert witnesses can present what would normally be considered inadmissible evidence); Ross Andrew Oliver, Note, Testimonial Hearsay as the Basis for
Expert Opinion: The Intersection of the Confrontation Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 703 After
Crawford v. Washington, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1539, 1540 (2004) (noting that the Federal
Rules of Evidence allow expert witnesses to base opinions on hearsay or other inadmissible
evidence).
49 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). The testimonial
leeway granted to experts was greater when lay witnesses were prohibited from offering
opinions. See Burton v. Severance, 29 P. 200, 201 (Or. 1892). But now that lay witnesses
are routinely permitted to offer the kinds of opinions (which might be better described as
inferences, although the Advisory Committee prefers “opinions”) that lay people would
ordinarily draw, the gap between what experts and lay witnesses can say has narrowed considerably. See FED. R. EVID. 701. Obviously there are differences in terms of the content of
the opinions, but it is no longer correct to think that experts are permitted to draw inferences or offer opinions while lay people may only state facts.
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sive effect on jurors (and, perhaps, judges as well),50 that it needs to be
restricted.51 The image is of the expert who looks like a professor or scientist, festooned with degrees and fancy titles, using incomprehensible technical jargon to convince a jury to rely on her conclusions regardless of their
correctness or the soundness of the methods by which they were reached.52
Of course there really are experts, and their expertise has long been
essential, both in court and out. And as legal questions become ever more
technical, whether because they involve difficult scientific questions or complex financial transactions or something else, expertise is becoming more
rather than less necessary.53 Indeed, the value of experts is so obvious that
historically the formal test for admissibility has been quite low. Daubert aside,
the traditional standard for admissibility of expert testimony is simply that
the testimony will assist the trier of fact.54 And although it is difficult to
understand the notion of assisting the trier of fact in the same probabilistic
or Bayesian language we associate with Rule 40155 or other versions of the
idea of logical relevance, the traditional formal standard seems no more
stringent than the relevance standard, and may be even less.56
Formal standards notwithstanding, in practice, both state and federal
courts have imposed increasingly higher barriers to the introduction of
expert testimony. Traditionally these barriers were erected even in the
50 On judges being subject to many of the same failings in assessing factual evidence as
juries, see Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 13–33 (2007); Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1138–39 (2005); Barbara A. Spellman, On the Supposed Expertise of Judges in Evaluating Evidence, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 6–7 (2007); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1259 (2005).
51 See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (describing
Daubert as based on the Supreme Court’s fear that jurors will be “awestruck by the expert’s
mystique”).
52 On the fear of jury overvaluation of expert and scientific evidence, see United States
v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ganadonegro, 805 F. Supp.
2d 1188, 1199, 1203 (D.N.M. 2011); United States v. Sessa, 806 F. Supp. 1063, 1066
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 250–51 (Ariz. 1986); Coble v. State, 330
S.W.3d 253, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
53 See Jed Rakoff, Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Age of Economic Expertise,
17 FORDHAM. J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4, 4–6 (2012).
54 See FED. R. EVID. 702.
55 Thus there has been confusion about the relationship of the issue of reliability to
the issue of relevance under Rule 401. Some courts see reliability as part of a relevance
determination under (state) Rule 401. See, e.g., State v. Fleming, 698 A.2d 503, 507 (Me.
1997). But that view seems at odds with the language and import of 401, as opposed to the
better view that the 401 and 702 requirements are overlapping. See Lithuanian Commerce
Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 179 F.R.D. 450, 459 (D.N.J. 1998). The still better, and we think
correct, view is that a reliability determination is now mandatory under Rule 702 and no
part of Rule 401, a view supported by even the pre-Daubert decision in Reed v. State, 391
A.2d 364, 411 (Md. 1978).
56 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 7.6, at 709–12 (concluding that the
helpfulness standard by itself excludes virtually nothing).
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absence of distinct rules for expert testimony,57 with trial judges imposing
standards within the basic relevancy framework that were stricter or different
when the relevancy question arose with respect to expert testimony.58 The
gradual increase in and differentiation of the admissibility standards for
expert testimony was supported by the deference that trial evidentiary rulings
have long received,59 but still there were no specific rules focused exclusively
on the evidence of experts. Then came Frye,60 which imposed the distinct
added layer of a requirement of general acceptance within the relevant field
on top of the traditional requirement of relevance.61 And it is this distinct
criterion—a requirement of something in addition to relevance—that marks
the beginning of the modern era. Daubert subsequently solidified this shift
towards a distinct additional requirement for expert evidence by not only
explicitly rejecting collapsing the question of expert admissibility into the
relevancy determination,62 but also by mandating standards that emphasized
the difference between determinations of relevancy and of expert
admissibility.63
That the standards for expert admissibility are becoming progressively
more demanding should come as no surprise. The quantity of mass tort
cases is accelerating,64 as are complaints that juries in those cases are too
easily persuaded, especially on the question of causation, by scientists and
scientific authority of dubious reliability.65 Daubert’s heightened standards
reflect this concern with jury overvaluation of expert testimony, especially in
civil cases, but it is a concern, as we have seen, that has been around for more
57 See 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVIDENCE, supra note 19, at 517; Mason Ladd, Expert
Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 414 (1952).
58 See, e.g., Cote v. Michou, 113 A. 210, 211 (N.H. 1921) (noting that expert testimony
is “especially potent”); Bradley v. Palmer, 61 N.E. 856, 881 (Ill. 1901) (expressing concern
that statements by experts would likely “influence the jury” to consider inadmissible evidence); Capitula v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 192 N.Y.S. 745, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922) (Hinman,
J., concurring in part) (arguing that expert testimony can give a “false guide”).
59 See David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1155,
1188, 1228 (1992).
60 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
61 See id. at 1014.
62 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1993).
63 The effect of Daubert is highlighted in the case on remand, where Judge Kozinski
noted that judges must deal with a “far more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert
world.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
64 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (noting the “elephantine
mass of asbestos cases”); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (noting an increase in cases presenting scientific issues, e.g., cases determining the liability of carcinogen producing companies).
65 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1042 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) (Posner, J., sitting by designation) (“The primary purpose of the Daubert filter is
to protect juries from being bamboozled by technical evidence of dubious merit . . . .”);
HUBER, supra note 4, at 16; Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Draining of Daubert
and the Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 220
(2006).
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than a century. The question that lies at the core of the worry about overvaluation, though, and thus at the core of the special treatment of expert evidence, is whether the concern with overvaluation is empirically justified.
III. TWO RESPONSES
Assessing the longstanding belief in jury overvaluation of expert evidence is a task that is both empirical and conceptual. The empirical task
requires that we rely on something more than tradition, and instead examine
both the evidence for such overvaluation and also the evidence for the lack
of overvaluation for non-expert—or so-called direct—evidence. We examine
these two aspects of the empirical inquiry first, and then turn to the conceptual issues.
A.
1.

The Empirical Response

On Overvaluing the Overvaluation of Expert Testimony

Ever since experts have been testifying, courts and commentators have
worried that judges and jurors, themselves lacking the relevant expertise, will
be unable to distinguish genuine expertise from the external trappings of
it.66 It seems rational for novices to defer to experts, but precisely because
novices are novices it is difficult for them to know who the experts are, and to
determine whether they have the requisite degree of expertise to justify deference.67 It is not that expertise cannot be valuable. The concern is that
non-expert triers of fact will consistently overvalue expert testimony beyond
its intrinsic epistemic worth.68
The problem with the longstanding and pervasive belief in jury overvaluation of expert testimony is that it may not be supported by the evidence.69
Initially, although it is true that people are often influenced by the trappings
of authority, these trappings can sometimes constitute rational grounds for
non-experts to identify experts and evaluate their judgments. Wearing a
white lab coat or a tweed jacket with elbow patches might in most cases say
66 See Ronald J. Allen & Esfand Nafisi, Daubert and Its Discontents, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
131, 132 (2010); Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE
L.J. 1535, 1538–39 (1998); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1182.
The problem of non-experts being unable to identify and evaluate expertise is by no means
restricted to law. Any attempt to gain knowledge from experts is beset by the dilemma of
attempting, without the benefit of expertise, to figure out who the experts are. For a philosophical take on the issue, see Frederick F. Schmitt, Justification, Sociality, and Autonomy, 73
SYNTHESE 43, 43–74 (1987).
67 See Charles Arthur Willard, Authority, 12 INFORMAL LOGIC 11, 18 (1990) (rationalizing the common need of lay people to find and depend on authority); sources cited
supra note 66.
68 See supra notes 51–52, 58 and accompanying text.
69 For useful overviews of the research, which is described in more detail below, see
Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the
Messenger and the Message, 28 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 445–46 (2003); Neil Vidmar, Expert
Evidence, the Adversary System, and the Jury, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S137, S137–42 (2005).
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little about the soundness of the views offered by people so clothed, but
other indicators of expertise are more reliable. Members of the National
Academy of Sciences or holders of endowed chairs in their specialties at
major universities are more likely actually to be experts than those who are
just dressed in the right clothes or exhibit the expected demeanor. Of
course sometimes the indicators of expertise turn out to be less reliable, as
when Nobel Prize winners opine on matters far removed from what they have
won the prizes for. Still, it is hardly irrational for people to value the indicators of epistemic authority even when they do not understand the underlying
subject, nor is it misguided to take the opinions of people possessing such
indicators as authoritative. At the very least, we should not too quickly agree
that a jury or judge is acting irrationally in taking certain externally observable indicia of expertise as useful proxies for the underlying soundness of the
opinions of those who display such indicia.70
More importantly, a substantial body of research, mostly produced by
psychologists, casts doubt on the empirical foundations of the longstanding
belief in jury overvaluation of expert testimony. As one article put it, “The
doubts about jury competence . . . stand in sharp contrast to the judgments
of scholars who conduct research on jury decisionmaking.”71 More particularly, an American Bar Association study found no undue expert influence
on juries in the complex cases it studied.72 And a more recent survey article
concluded that “[c]laims about jury incompetence, irresponsibility, and bias
in responding to expert evidence [are] not consistent with a review of the
many studies that have examined these issues from various methodological
perspectives.”73
To be sure, juries may sometimes or even often find specific items of
evidence in complex cases beyond their ken.74 And we know that jurors may
occasionally become especially befuddled by highly technical scientific evi70 See Anthony Champagne et al., Expert Witnesses in the Courts: An Empirical Examination, 76 JUDICATURE 5, 7–10 (1992); Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurors in Complex
Cases: Judges and Jurors Outline the Problems, TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 65, 68 (reporting research
showing that jurors engaged in careful analysis of expert credentials in deciding whom to
believe); Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in
the Courts—Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 199–200 (1994). Especially
because jurors have less personal involvement in the outcome than, say, the parties in a
lawsuit, they are more likely, as the literature on persuasion teaches us, to rely on secondary (peripheral) indicators such as credentials rather than engaging in close (central)
examination of the content of an assertion. See Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The
Effects of Involvement on Responses to Argument Quantity and Quality: Central and Peripheral
Routes to Persuasion, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 69, 79–80 (1984).
71 Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials,
40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 744–45 (1991).
72 See SPECIAL COMM. ON JURY COMPREHENSION., AM. BAR ASSOC., JURY COMPREHENSION
IN COMPLEX CASES 40 (1989).
73 Vidmar, supra note 69, at S142.
74 See Joseph Sanders, Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. SYS. J., no. 2, 1993, at 45, 61–65 [hereinafter Sanders, Jury Deliberation]; Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissi-
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dence.75 But other research reveals that jurors often do understand technical evidence, even in complex cases.76 Moreover, even when jurors
misunderstand specific items of scientific, technical, or statistical evidence,
such micro-misunderstandings seem rarely to be the cause of erroneous verdicts. On the contrary, evidentiary complexity has been found not to explain
differences between judge and jury outcomes,77 and studies of presumably
complex medical malpractice claims “have found jury verdicts to be moderately to strongly related to expert judgments of physician negligence.”78
Part of the explanation for the tendency of juries to get it right more
often than the skeptical tradition believes can be found in research focused
on particular potential sources of juror error. For example, although there is
a widespread fear of excessive influence by paid experts,79 it turns out that
both actual jurors and experimental subjects in mock jury studies80 understand the incentives of paid experts, and as a result often substantially or even
completely discount the opinions of those they perceive as “hired gun[s].”81
bility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 904–05 (2003) [hereinafter Sanders,
Merits].
75 See MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE 24–26
(1987); John S. DeWitt et al., Novel Scientific Evidence and Controversial Cases: A Social Psychological Examination, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 8–11 (1997); M. Daniel Jacoubovitch et al.,
Juror Responses to Direct and Mediated Presentations of Expert Testimony, 7 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 227, 232–36 (1977).
76 See Ivkovic & Hans, supra note 69, at 446; Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex
Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT 181, 192–94 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993);
Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific/Medical
Issues? Some Data from Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 903 (1994); Neil Vidmar &
Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1140–42
(2001).
77 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven & Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 190–94 (2005);
see also Vidmar, supra note 69, at S138 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)) (concluding that Kalven and Zeisel’s 1950s study supports the position
that evidence complexity does not explain the twenty percent of cases in which judge and
jury disagree about the outcome).
78 Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 685 (2001); accord Vidmar, supra note 69, at
S138–39.
79 A fear that has existed for as long as experts have been testifying. See Winans v. N.Y.
& Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1858) (expressing concerns about the ease of obtaining
the “opinions of persons professing to be experts”). For a recounting of the history of this
concern, see Susan Haack, Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law,
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4–5 (2009).
80 Mock jury studies often use college students as subjects, but it has been shown that
college students perform similarly in studies to a cross-section of jury-eligible adults. See
Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 75, 77–80 (1999).
81 Joel Cooper & Isaac M. Neuhaus, The “Hired Gun” Effect: Assessing the Effect of Pay,
Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony, 24 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 149, 162 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 173 (1995); Sanders, Jury Deliberation, supra note 74,

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-1\NDL101.txt

16

unknown

Seq: 16

notre dame law review

19-NOV-13

14:35

[vol. 89:1

Other studies indicate that experts’ race and gender have almost no effect on
juror assessment of their credibility.82 Similarly, juries have been found not
to be seduced by an expert testifying with high confidence, and tend to credit
medium-confidence experts and discount the testimony of high-confidence
ones.83 And a very recent review has found that the long-alleged susceptibility of jurors to overpersuasion by neuroscience evidence has “little empirical
support.”84
Cumulatively, this research suggests that juries might not be nearly as
prone to failures of understanding and judgment in the evaluation of expert
testimony as the conventional legal wisdom supposes.85 In the face of this
evidence, it is possible to speculate that some of the traditional but largely
unsupported fear of jury overvaluation is premised on assumptions about
how individual jurors, often of limited sophistication, will react to an expert
and expert testimony. But jurors do not typically evaluate evidence—any evidence—by themselves. Nor do they make decisions in isolation from other
evidence and from trial processes generally. Actual trials involve both crossexamination and the opportunity for opposing parties to present their own
contrary evidence and their own opposing experts. As a result, it should
come as little surprise that we know from the research that people become
less gullible and less prone to overpersuasion when there is an opportunity
for opposing parties to challenge experts and their expertise.86 Moreover,
at 51; Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 76, at 1155; see also Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic:
An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109,
1126–30 (1997) (describing skepticism by capital juries of experts who were obviously playing an adversarial role).
82 See James V. Couch & Jennifer N. Sigler, Gender of an Expert Witness and the Jury
Verdict, 52 PSYCHOL. REC. 281, 285 (2002); Amina Memon & Daniel W. Shuman, Juror Perception of Experts in Civil Disputes: The Role of Race and Gender, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 179,
189 (1998); Lynelle Vondergeest et al., Effects of Juror and Expert Witness Gender on Jurors’
Perceptions of an Expert Witness, 1 MOD. PSYCHOL. STUD. 1, 5 (1993).
83 See Robert J. Cramer et al., Expert Witness Confidence and Juror Personality: Their Impact
on Credibility and Persuasion in the Courtroom, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 63, 68 (2009).
84 Farah & Hook, supra note 24, at 88. Farah and Hook are responding, most particularly, to another recent study. See Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of
Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470–77 (2008). Consistent with
the Farah and Hook conclusions are several other studies that found no overvaluation of
neuroscience evidence or images. See N.J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a
Mens Rea Defense: No Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 382 (2011); N.J. Schweitzer
& Michael J. Saks, Neuroimage Evidence and the Insanity Defense, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 592, 603
(2011).
85 Note also that the conventional wisdom, as captured by the “gatekeeper” metaphor,
see supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text, presupposes that judges are less susceptible
than juries to whatever overvaluation there may be, but this too may not be true. See Sanders, Merits, supra note 74, at 937–38.
86 See Edith Greene et al., Juror Decisions About Damages in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 107, 119 (1999); Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Reasoning About
Scientific Evidence: Effects of Juror Gender and Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work
Environment Case, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 362, 372 (1999); David P. McCabe et al., The
Influence of fMRI Lie Detection Evidence on Juror Decision-Making, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 566, 572
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we also know that similar processes and interactions occur during jury deliberation, enabling the self-correcting dimensions of group deliberation to permit jurors to correct the misimpressions of other jurors, and also to bring up
evidence that the recollections of other jurors may have neglected.87
It is important to bear in mind that the concern underlying the special
treatment of expert evidence is a fear of overvaluation. The research just
summarized supports the view that this fear, if ever appropriate, would be
most appropriate when only one side has expert witnesses. Thus, although
there may well be a limited supply of those who can offer direct evidence,
that limitation may not exist with respect to experts, leading to what David
Bernstein and others have referred to as a potential “adversarial bias.”88
Under circumstances of substantial resource disparity between the sides, this
possibility may well arise, and should not be underestimated. Still, in the
normal case there will be opposing experts, leading most often simply to misunderstanding. And when there is juror misunderstanding, overvaluation
may not be the consequence. At times, jurors who do not understand the
technical evidence in a complex case simply ignore all of the expert evidence
on both sides,89 which is as compatible with undervaluation as it is with overvaluation. Similarly, even when jurors do understand the expert evidence,
(2011). Indeed, even cross-examination that itself has a questionable empirical basis may
effectively undercut the effect of expert testimony. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Dirty Tricks of
Cross-Examination: The Influence of Conjectural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
373, 378 (1990).
87 See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 230–31 (1988); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE
THE JURY 99–108 (1983); Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, Real Juries, 1 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 269 (2005); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 206 (1989); Jessica M. Salerno & Shari Seidman Diamond,
The Promise of a Cognitive Perspective on Jury Deliberation, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 174,
176–77 (2010); see also Kamala London & Narina Nunez, The Effect of Jury Deliberations on
Jurors’ Propensity to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 932, 937–38 (2000)
(suggesting that jury deliberation helps lessen the biasing impact of inadmissible
evidence).
88 “Adversarial bias” includes (but is not limited to) the ability of parties to select
experts to suit their adversarial aims in ways that are much more limited than those who
offer so-called direct evidence. Bernstein, supra note 7, at 454–56; accord Michael D.
Green, Pessimism About Milward, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 41, 56–59 (2013). But much
(although not all) of the concern with adversarial bias is dependent on the assumption
that bias in the selection, payment, and testimony of experts will be largely undetected by
the trier of fact, an assumption that may not be sound, see supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text, and which is thus less different from overvaluation than may at first sight
appear.
89 See Goodman et al., supra note 70, at 66. Doing so is not necessarily irrational.
Suspension of judgment in the face of expert disagreement is often quite reasonable. See
Ben Almassi, Conflicting Expert Testimony and the Search for Gravitational Waves, 76 PHIL. SCI.
570, 581 (2009). And juries, who are not permitted simply to refuse to decide the case,
may ignore conflicting expert testimony as a way of at least suspending judgment about the
relevance of the expertise.
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they sometimes ignore it when the experts offer opposing accounts or explanations.90 Moreover, studies about expert statistical evidence, which jurors
often do not understand, suggest even more specifically that errors of undervaluation are just as prevalent as errors of overvaluation.91 To the extent that
there is some or even much juror misunderstanding, therefore, it does not
follow that overvaluation is the necessary consequence. More likely, what
misunderstanding there is seems as likely to incline towards undervaluation
as towards the overvaluation that is the traditional concern.
2.

On Undervaluing the Overvaluation of Direct Testimony

The traditional fear of overvaluation of expert testimony is a comparative one. That is, the worry has been not only that juries will overvalue expert
testimony, but also that they will overvalue it while they are at the same time
valuing so-called direct evidence more or less accurately. Implicit in the
traditional view is the belief that overvaluation is not a problem with respect
to non-expert factual testimony because jurors (and judges), familiar in their
own lives with regularly assessing the accuracy of what is reported to them, do
not have the special disability in evaluating direct factual testimony that they
have in evaluating the testimony of experts.92 No one believes that juries will
be perfect in evaluating direct evidence, of course, but in the normal case,
there is no assumption of overvaluation.
As we now know, however, this longstanding assumption is likely false.
Judges and jurors may overvalue evidence they perceive as direct, and may be
especially susceptible to attributing excess credibility to eyewitness identifications and other forms of eyewitness testimony.93 Yet because of defects in
perception, memory, and description, direct or factual testimony may itself
be highly vulnerable to inaccuracy. But because judges and jurors are often
not aware of the factors that decrease the reliability of eyewitness perception
and memory—think of the number of local news shows that self-advertise as
“Eyewitness News”—the risk of overvaluation is especially great.
Jury overvaluation of this type of direct evidence is caused not only by
the widespread but mistaken belief in the accuracy of eyewitness testimony
90 See Nancy Brekke & Eugene Borgida, Expert Psychological Testimony in Rape Trials: A
Social-Cognitive Analysis, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 372, 379–81 (1988).
91 See David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes’ Theorem in the Trial Process: Instructing
Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 13–14 (1988); Jason
Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies,
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 178 (1999).
92 See Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N.Y. 507, 514 (1884) (noting that jurors’ common sense
is normally sufficient to evaluate evidence).
93 See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text; see also Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F.
Loftus, Eyewitness Memory for People and Events, in 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY, 617, 624
(Randy K. Otto & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 2012) (explaining that mistaken identification can be the primary evidence leading to wrongful convictions); cf. David Dunning &
Emily Balcetis, Wishful Seeing: How Preferences Shape Visual Perception, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 33, 34 (2013) (showing how initial perceptions as well as recall may be
distorted by outcome preferences).
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and other forms of first-hand observation,94 but also by the equally mistaken
belief that judges and juries are competent evaluators of the veracity of those
who are offering such testimony.95 “[T]he jury is the lie detector in the
courtroom,” it is said,96 but we now know that juries, like ordinary people in
general, are rather poor at identifying liars.97 Indeed, it appears that ordinary people, even apart from being generally incompetent in distinguishing
liars from truth-tellers, are more prone to identify liars as truth-tellers than
they are to identify truth-tellers as liars.98 And thus the research supports the
conclusion that in evaluating the testimony of non-experts, juries may be
inclined not only towards error, but towards the error of failing to identify
untruthfulness more than failing to identify truthfulness. In other words, in
this way too, the risk is precisely the risk of overvaluation.
Thus the risk of overvaluation appears to be at least as great for factual
and so-called direct evidence as it is for expert testimony. But the overvaluation of direct or factual evidence has been typically underappreciated, just as
the overvaluation of expert evidence has been typically over-appreciated. But
if expert testimony is less subject to overvaluation than the traditional view
supposes, and non-expert direct or factual testimony more subject to overvaluation, the gap between the two evaporates.99 And if there is little or no
support for the conclusion that overvaluation differentiates expert from non94 Some or much of jury overvaluation of direct evidence is a product of the various
cognitive errors identified in the heuristics and biases literature. See James S. Liebman et
al., The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Non-Matches as Evidence of Innocence, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 577,
624–51 (2013). And consider as well the way in which recent research has undercut the
traditional reliance on the reliability of confessions. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance
of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1092–1107 (2010); see also Jennifer T. Perillo &
Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: The Lie, the Bluff, and False Confessions, 35 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 327, 334 (2011) (claiming that experimental results showed that the common bluff
technique that police officers use often leads innocent people to confess).
95 On the traditional confidence in juries as evaluators of witness veracity, see George
Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 581–84 (1997).
96 United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973); accord United States v.
Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920,
923 (Pa. 1986).
97 See Geoffrey R. Loftus, What Can a Perception-Memory Expert Tell a Jury?, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 143, 143–44 (2010); Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence
and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817,
819–22 (1995). On the poor ability of ordinary people to detect deception, see Charles F.
Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 216–17 (2006).
98 See Bond & DePaulo, supra note 97, at 231.
99 The statement in the text is a bit of an exaggeration. If we had accurate measures of
overvaluation and undervaluation, we might discover that there was a difference between
the respective treatments of expert and direct evidence even if there was less overvaluation
of expert evidence and more overvaluation of direct evidence than traditionally believed.
But in the absence of such measures, perhaps the more accurate statement is that there is
no support for the belief that the overvaluation of expert testimony is greater than the
overvaluation of direct testimony.
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expert testimony, much of the foundation upon which the special and more
stringent treatment of expert testimony appears to collapse.100
B.

The Conceptual Response

The empirical support for the comparative skepticism about expert testimony is deeply suspect, but that is not the only problem. The conceptual
foundation for treating expert testimony differently may be problematic as
well. Recall that the differential treatment is premised on a basic difference
between the opinions that experts offer and the facts that non-experts report.
But even the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, in its original Note on Rule
701, recognized the weaknesses of the fact-opinion distinction.101 Evidentiary opinions, after all, are inferences from facts.102 But most of what we
consider facts are inferences from even more basic facts. Even putting what
philosophers call “sense data” aside,103 when we say that we have seen a fight
or a game, for example, we have made an inference from having observed
some number of bodily movements, facial expressions, and the like. And the
same holds true for statements of causation, as when a statement that someone was intoxicated presupposes that the condition we observed was caused
by ingestion of alcohol rather than by illness.
Increasingly it has been recognized, therefore, that the inferences that
experts draw from the more basic facts that they observe are not fundamentally different from the inferences that ordinary people draw on a regular
basis.104 Typically an expert offers an opinion about what, on the basis of
her experience and training, might flow from some set of assumed facts. But
the lay witness, in saying that someone appeared to be hurrying, or nervous,
or male, or tall, or drunk,105 is offering an opinion about what, based on the
witness’s own perceived facts, might be inferred from those facts. That in
one case the underlying facts are perceived by the witness and in the other
are assumed or perceived by someone else may be less of a difference than is
100 We say “much of” because there are other possible justifications. Some of these
have been noted above. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. Another possible
justification is that the supply of witnesses who can offer direct testimony is limited while
the supply of potential experts is not so limited, a differential that may be magnified when
there are resource differentials between the parties. See supra note 88 and accompanying
text.
101 See FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s note (1972 proposed rules); see also
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988) (noting the absence of a clear
distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion).
102 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 7.4, at 703 (recognizing that opinions
are actually collections of particular facts); EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
27 (3d ed. 1984) (criticizing the distinction between statements of fact and statements of
opinion).
103 See Michael Huemer, Sense-Data, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sense-data.
104 See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
105 See State v. Sweet, 949 A.2d 809, 813 (N.J. 2008) (upholding lay opinion on
drunkenness).
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often thought, at least once we understand, as even the Advisory Committee
understood, that most factual observations involve inferences—and therefore
opinions106—as well.
Consider the case of drunkenness.107 Suppose a lay witness observes
someone slurring his speech, talking inappropriately loudly, and stumbling
as he tries to walk. Under such circumstances, the witness is routinely
allowed to offer the opinion, as lay opinion, that the person observed was
drunk.108 And such an opinion offered by the witness need not clear any
higher hurdle or be supported by any separate justification. Rule 701 is
about the style of testimony, but does not add additional barriers. But now
suppose instead that the lay witness observes the same acts, describes them in
(comparatively) basic factual terms, and is then followed on the witness stand
by an expert on inebriation who is asked whether, in her opinion, based on
what the lay witness has just said, the person the witness observed was drunk.
Now the expert’s testimony need not only make the conclusion more likely
than it was without the evidence—as would be the case if it were the observer
offering the opinion—but must also meet the additional requirement of
establishing that the methods she uses to infer drunkenness meet the additional and heightened standards of Daubert. The witness in the first variant
and the expert in the second are doing essentially the same thing, but the
traditional skepticism about expert testimony requires the expert’s testimony
to clear barriers that the lay witness’s testimony need not.
Adding one additional assumption to this example makes the problem
with the traditional approach to expert testimony even more apparent. Suppose now that the lay witness has, over the course of his life, observed only a
very small number of people who were actually drunk (and had never
observed anyone with very low blood sugar). Were that the case, the witness
would still be permitted to testify, and his lack of experience with or extensive observation of inebriates would go to the weight of his lay opinion, but
not to its admissibility. And, in accordance with the permissive purpose of
Rule 401 and its state equivalents, the evidence would be presumptively
admissible. But if instead the expert testifies about the inferences she would
draw from exactly the same facts, the burden then shifts to the proponent of
the evidence to make an affirmative demonstration of reliability. So not only
does it seem anomalous that an additional hurdle is added when the expert is
drawing the same inferences from the same facts as the lay person, but now
the anomaly appears even greater because here the expert is more reliable
than the lay witness but is implicitly treated with greater skepticism.
106 Indeed, the Advisory Committee on the most recent “restyling” of the Federal Rules
of Evidence eliminated the word “inference” from Rule 701 because of its belief that inferences are covered by the broader term “opinions,” and that courts have never distinguished between an inference and an opinion. FED. R. EVID. 701, advisory committee’s
note (2011 amendments).
107 See Singletary v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 623 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 1980).
108 See, e.g., Mickelson v. State, 287 P.3d 750, 754 (Wyo. 2012); State v. Ards, 816
N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
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Examples like these emphasize the conceptual oddity of the special
treatment of experts. When lay witnesses testify, most of what they say, even
when not explicitly offering an “opinion,” is by way of inference from more
basic observed facts. Whether those inferences are justified is a question similar in structure to the inferences drawn by experts. Yet one of the more
traditional justifications for the special treatments of experts, even if fading
into the background with the rise of the (empirically dubious) concern with
overvaluation, is that experts may offer opinions while lay witnesses must stick
to the facts.109 But if the distinction between fact and opinion collapses,
then so does a justification for the special treatment of expert testimony that
depends on that distinction. If, apart from the content of the opinion, lay
witnesses can now do what experts can do—and that is the import of Rule
701—then any distinction between lay and expert witnesses turns only on the
content of their knowledge. And if, as we have seen above, the content of the
knowledge may not justify treating expert testimony with greater skepticism
than lay testimony, then little of the foundation for treating experts differently remains.
The lack of a conceptual distinction between lay and expert testimony is
underscored by the fact that lay inferences are typically dependent on expert
opinion. The recent philosophical attention to testimony in general110 highlights the issue. Our knowledge, whether in general or about specific acts or
events, is hardly the exclusive product of our own observations.111 It is a
function of our own observations filtered through countless other observations and epistemic inputs, many of which rely on the statements of others.
Moreover, a large proportion of the statements of others on which we rely
are statements whose veracity we respect because we attribute authority to the
makers of those statements.112 When we spot a bird with a red breast digging
for worms and then report that we have seen a robin, we rely, at least in part,
on the authority of those whose expertise is a component of what leads us to
believe that this is a robin. Similarly, when we smell rotten eggs outside our
house, we suspect a gas leak and not a surreptitious depositor of rotten eggs
on our lawn precisely because we have learned from experts, and only from
experts, that natural gas, as treated for residential use, has the smell of rotten
eggs. Rule 701(c) allows lay witnesses to give opinion testimony if the opin109 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., C.A.J. COADY, TESTIMONY (1994); JENNIFER LACKEY, LEARNING FROM WORDS
(2008); Robert Audi, The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification, 34 AM.
PHIL. Q. 405 (1997); Richard Moran, Getting Told and Being Believed, in THE EPISTEMOLOGY
OF TESTIMONY 272 (Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa eds., 2006); Philip J. Nickel, Trust and
Testimony, 93 PAC. PHIL. Q. 301 (2012).
111 See John Hardwig, Epistemic Dependence, 82 J. PHIL. 335, 349 (1985) [hereinafter
Hardwig, Epistemic Dependence] (concluding that “there is knowledge that is known by the
community, not by any individual knower”); see also John Hardwig, The Role of Trust in
Knowledge, 88 J. PHIL. 693, 706 (1991) (arguing for an “epistemic cooperation” that
requires “reliance on the testimony of others”).
112 See Hardwig, Epistemic Dependence, supra note 111, at 336 (“[A]ppeals to epistemic
authority are [an] essential[ ] ingredient in much of our knowledge.”).
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ion is “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,”113
but most of the opinions that most of us have are highly dependent on what
we have learned from experts.
Evidence law has long viewed direct observation as empirically reliable
and philosophically unproblematic, but it turns out that neither of these
beliefs is nearly as sound as evidence law has long believed. More particularly, evidence law’s traditional privileging of individual observation is in reality a privileging of knowledge that comes in part from experts. A further
anomaly, therefore, lies in the fact that when experts testify directly, their
evidence has traditionally been suspect for fear of overvaluation, but when
lay witnesses offer opinions or even facts, expert knowledge appears to be
coming in the back door through expert-dependent observations. The puzzle, therefore, is in understanding why direct expert testimony is thought
suspect when indirect expert evidence is not.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Our argument is solely about the differential treatment of expert and
non-expert evidence. It is not about the non-relative standards that should
be applied to the admission of either lay or expert testimony. But differences
can be resolved in one of two ways—the higher can be lowered or the lower
can be raised. So although it might seem that the natural import of our
argument, if accepted, would be to lower the standards for admitting expert
testimony,114 or, more precisely, to eliminate the Daubert (or Frye, for that
matter) overlay on normal relevancy requirements, the difference might also
be eliminated by raising the relevancy bar. If we are worried about jury overvaluation,115 but not persuaded that there is differential overvaluation
between factual observation and expert opinion, one solution could be to
raise the standards of relevancy in all cases, perhaps by requiring reliability,
or substantial reliability, for all evidence, and not just expert evidence.
This is not the place to consider this possibility in depth, largely because
of the pervasive implications such a change in the baseline standards for relevancy might have on a wide range of other issues, including questions of
access to litigation, the desirability (or not) of using the same rules and criteria of admissibility for criminal as for civil cases,116 and the desirability (or
not) of having the same rules for defendants as for the prosecution in crimi113 FED. R. EVID. 701(c).
114 See Leslie I. Boden & David Ozonoff, Litigation-Generated Science: Why Should We
Care?, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 117, 121 (2008) (arguing for the lowering of the standards to admit expert testimony).
115 The arguments of Professor Friedman are in this neighborhood. See Friedman,
supra note 35. Friedman appears to believe that there is overvaluation of expert testimony,
but that overvaluation neither explains the Daubert revolution nor provides a satisfactory
solution to the problem of too-frequent or too-large verdicts in mass tort and similar cases.
116 On the possibility that application of Daubert has produced, in fact and in practice,
differences between civil and criminal cases with respect to admission of expert testimony,
see Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Revisited, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 302, 305 (2005).
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nal cases.117 It may be, for example, that the extremely low standards of
relevancy embodied in Rule 401 and its ilk are a product of the justifiable
desire to allow a criminal defendant the greatest leeway in presenting evidence in defense, such that the more pervasive regime of permissibility that
now exists is merely the consequence of the combination of a willingness to
assist defendants whose liberty or life is at issue coupled with a reluctance to
have the trial system use different rules of evidence for different types of
cases and different sides of the same case. And that reluctance, in turn, may
be a function, at least in part, of having a court system whose judges typically
hear both civil and criminal cases, thus making it difficult to imagine a successful system in which judges employed different evidentiary rules and principles from one case to another. Pulling too hard at the loose thread of
expert testimony, therefore, may cause too much of the entire apparatus of
civil and criminal procedure, as well as court organization, to unravel.
That said, however, it remains worth observing that Daubert may itself
have been a solution mismatched to the problem it was designed to solve.
Let us assume that there really is a problem of outsize judgments being levied
against corporations that have not done very much wrong.118 We are far
from sure that this is so, and indeed, we remain skeptical that this is a problem. But the view that there is a problem—whether because of legally unjustified sympathy for plaintiffs or because of equally legally unjustified desire to
punish large corporations—is by no means frivolous.119 And if this is a problem, then we might inquire into the causes of that problem and what remedies might be available to alleviate it.
The Daubert defendants and the many amici supporting them assume
that the problem is that juries are persuaded by the so-called junk science in
delivering their verdicts. But we know that juries are often highly sympathetic to plaintiffs in their suits against corporations or insured defendants in
numerous contexts, engaging in social engineering or cost-shifting simply to
allocate resources away from large corporations and towards people injured
through no or little fault of their own, the law notwithstanding.120 To the
extent that this is so, the problem is not so much with junk science and with
what might persuade or overpersuade a jury as with the fact that the cases get
to the jury in the first place. After all, a jury inclined to punish a corporation
or transfer money from corporations to injured people could do so, if it gets
the case, even if they are not specifically persuaded about the existence of
causation as a scientific matter.
117 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE 131–44 (2007) (arguing for
an asymmetry between prosecution and defense in the admission of scientific evidence).
118 See HUBER, supra note 4, for what has become the canonical statement of this view.
119 See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance as a
Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 914 (1998); Lisa Litwiller, From Exxon to Engle: The
Futility of Assessing Punitive Damages as Against Corporate Entities, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 301, 344
(2004); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237,
241 (2000).
120 See, e.g., Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 119, at 903, 916–17.
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It is worthwhile noting in this context that none of the numerous briefs
in Daubert actually relied on any research to support their claims of jury-overvaluation. Nor did they provide empirical support for their implicit claim
that without the junk science the problem of the corporation-punishing jury
would be lessened. The essence of the arguments of Merrell Dow and its
supporting amici is that juries are persuaded by junk science, and that being
persuaded by the junk science is the principal cause of a legally unjustified
verdict. But there was little hard evidence in Daubert that any of these causal
links actually exist.
Insofar as there is a problem, it appears to be less the jury overvaluation
of junk science, and less the role of any such overvaluation in producing a
legally unjustified verdict, and more the fact that some cases are getting to
juries that should not. If the case does not get to the jury, then the possibility
of jury-produced and legally unjustified charity, punishment, or cost-shifting
is eliminated. So one possibility may be the laxity of the showing required to
survive a motion for summary judgment.121 Another might be the laxity of
the general relevancy standard for admissibility. And still another could even
be laxity in the underlying standards of liability.122 If substantial reliability
were a general requirement for admissibility, for example, it is possible that
unreliable scientific evidence could be excluded without creating what
appears to be an indefensible differential between expert and so-called direct
or factual evidence.
It is an interesting question whether non-expert evidence could satisfy
the existing substantive law of torts as applied in the typical mass tort case.
Suppose ten witnesses testify that they had never been sick a day in their lives,
that they then moved in middle age to a community in close proximity to a
defendant’s chemical plant, and that they were all diagnosed with the same
form of cancer within a year. And suppose that this is the only evidence of
causation. Under such circumstances, faithful adherence to Rule 401 might
well allow the evidence, and faithful adherence to the existing law on summary judgment might permit the case to go to the jury. The question, and
one to which we do not have an answer, is how often a jury in such cases
would reach a judgment against the defendant as a way of compensating the
unfortunate plaintiffs, regardless of any strong evidence of causation, and
without any junk science whatsoever. Only if junk science would have made a

121 On the view that Daubert may have been more about the sufficiency of the evidence
than about its admissibility, see Michael D. Green & Joseph Sanders, Admissibility Versus
Sufficiency: Controlling the Quality of Expert Witness Testimony in the United States 1
(Mar. 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2016468.
122 Thus we see the suggestions for eliminating the causation requirement in some
number of torts, including many of the torts that are at the heart of Daubert issues. See, e.g.,
Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and
Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2117 (1997). For a challenge to the Berger position,
see Allen & Nafisi, supra note 66, at 149–62.
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judgment against the defendant more likely than without can junk science be
understood as having caused what, ex hypothesi, is the problem.
CONCLUSION
It is revealing that not one of the briefs by or supporting Merrell Dow in
Daubert brought forth any empirical evidence in support of the ubiquitous
assertions in ten of the fourteen briefs that jury misunderstanding or overvaluation of expert testimony is a problem in need of a solution. Perhaps this
was just good litigation strategy. If a raft of venerable intuitions is on your
side, as it is here, and most of the real research is against you, as it is here,
then relying on the common intuitions and not even mentioning the word
“research” is good litigation strategy.
But good litigation strategy does not always produce good law. Much of
evidence law in general has been constructed on an edifice of misinformation, pop psychology, and urban legends which is embarrassed by much of
the modern research. The special treatment of expert testimony, and especially the overvaluation claims on which much of that special treatment is
premised, is one of the areas in which evidence law seems most dramatically
at odds with the current state of knowledge. It is ironic that the existing
attempts to bring good science into the courtroom rest on such a thin scientific basis.

